Author Archive

Internet Hysteria – Are We Losing Our Edge?

Thursday, December 15th, 2011

Scott Wallsten and Amy Smorodin

From Anthony Wiener’s wiener to the FCC’s brave stand on Americans’ shameful inability to turn down the damn volume by themselves, 2011 has been a big year for tech and communications policy. But how has one of the Washington tech crowd’s most important products—Internet hype—fared this year?  In this post, we seek to answer this crucial question.

The Internet Hysteria Index

The Internet is without doubt the most powerful inspiration for hyperbole in the history of mankind. Some extol the Internet’s greatness, like Howard Dean, who called the Internet “the most important tool for re-democratizing the world since Gutenberg invented the printing press.”[1] Others fret about the future, like Canada’s Office of Privacy Commissioner, who claimed, “Nothing in society poses as grave a threat to privacy as the Internet Service Provider.”[2]

Sometimes the hyperbole is justified. For example, thanks to Twitter, attendees at this past summer’s TPI Aspen Summit were privy to a steady stream of misinformation even before the DC-area earthquake stopped.[3]

In the same spirit, we present the Internet Hysteria Index (IHI). The IHI, which the DOJ and FCC should take care not to confuse with the HHI, is the most rigorous and flexible tool ever conceived for gauging the Internet’s “worry zeitgeist”. It’s rigorous[4] because it uses numbers and flexible[5] because you can interpret it in so many different ways that it won’t threaten your preconceived ideas no matter what you believe.

The IHI has two components. The first tracks fears of an unrecognizable, but certainly Terminator-esque, future Internet. We count the number of times the exact phrases “the end of the internet as we know it” and “break the internet” appear in Nexis news searches each year since 2000.

Figure 1: The End of the Internet as we Know It!


Figure 1 shows that 2011 produced a bumper crop of “break the internet” stories, mostly related to the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP Act. The spike in 2006 reflects a wave of Net Neutrality stories after AT&T’s then-CEO proclaimed that “what they [content providers] would like to do is use my pipes free, and I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.”

As our research illustrates, the “End of the Internet” hyperbole shows a healthy, generally upward trend, reflecting the effectiveness of our collective fretting and hand-wringing. Our data do not allow us to identify[6] whether the trend is due to clever Washington PR, lazy hacks retreading old lines, real concerns, or collusion among interest groups simply ensuring they can all stay in business by responding to each other.

The second component of our index measures the incidence of hand-wringing regarding the state of broadband in the U.S. In particular, this measure counts the number of times phrases suggesting lagging U.S. broadband performance show up in Nexis since 2000.[7] Figure 2 shows the results of our analysis.

Figure 2: The Grass is So Much Greener on the Other Side of the Pond: U.S. Broadband Sucks


The big spike in 2010 is related to release of the National Broadband Plan. The prior high, in 2007, saw stories focusing on the OECD rankings, broadband mapping, and the beginnings of broadband plan discussions.

Unfortunately, 2011 was not a good year for misinterpreting shoddily-gathered statistics. Figure 2 shows a dramatic drop-off in bemoaning the dire state of U.S. broadband, possibly after everyone just got really, really tired of talking about the National Broadband Plan. We’re extremely concerned that as a result, the U.S. may have fallen dramatically in the OECD worry rankings. In fact, in a warning shot across our bow, on December 14 the BBC reported that “the UK remains in danger of falling behind when it comes to next-generation mobile services” and superfast broadband.[8] We’re hopeful American fretting will pick up once analysts actually read the FCC’s USF order that was promulgated under the cover of 23 days between approval and publication. On the other hand, there is a risk that the sheer volume of the Order—the equivalent of more than 4 million tweets—might dissuade people from talking about it ever again.

For generations, Americans have taken a back seat to nobody on the important issue of Internet hyperbole. Let’s hope the inside-the-beltway crowd pulls itself together and breathes some life back into the speech economy. Happy New Year.


[1] http://motherjones.com/politics/2007/06/interview-howard-dean-chairman-democratic-national-committee

[2] http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-greatest-threat-to-privacy/

[3] Picture from Funny Potato, http://www.funny-potato.com/blog/august-23rd-2011-east-coast-quake.

[4] It’s not.

[5] In other words, “probably pretty meaningless.”

[6] Actually, they do, but we don’t want to do the work.

[7] Specifically, the search is ((“U.S. falling behind “OR “U.S. lagging”) AND broadband) OR ((“United States falling behind” OR “United States lagging”) AND broadband).

[8] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16174745

The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Conundrum: Increase Efficiency AND Create Jobs?

Friday, December 2nd, 2011

How did the proposed AT&T and T-Mobile merger, which many viewed as so certain when announced, end up on life support? Is it because of the decision by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to challenge the merger in court? Or maybe because of skeptics’ claims regarding the likelihood of the merger “creating jobs?”

Those factors certainly played a role, but another reason the merger reached the brink of collapse is arguably because the current jobs crisis made it impossible for AT&T to justify the merger to antitrust authorities while also making it palatable to politicians and the FCC with its broader “public interest” standard.

For antitrust purposes, AT&T had to demonstrate that it would not substantially reduce competition and that if it did, the increased efficiency of a merged company would greatly outweigh those costs. For political purposes, in an era of persistent unemployment AT&T decided it had to demonstrate that the merger would create jobs.

Horizontal mergers between large competitors, such as the proposed one between AT&T and T-Mobile, are generally subject to tough antitrust scrutiny. Antitrust policy is indifferent to the effect of a merger on jobs, instead focusing on the effects of the merger on competition and consumers while weighing those effects against the potential economic benefits of a more efficient merged firm.

As the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines note, “Competition usually spurs firms to achieve efficiencies internally. Nevertheless, a primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products” (p.29).

The efficiency argument is always a high bar in a merger case since “the antitrust laws give competition, not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers” (p.31). One way the merged company might increase efficiency would be to lay off large numbers of workers if it believed it could maintain service quality while doing so. By appearing to take that option off the table and arguing that the merger was, in fact, good for jobs, AT&T raised the efficiency bar even higher than it normally is.

It is, of course, possible to increase employment and efficiency if the firm increases output by more than it increases costs. AT&T made an argument consistent with that outcome in its filings by contending that spectrum constraints are distorting investment decisions at both AT&T and T-Mobile.

AT&T’s biggest claim regarding jobs was that the merger would lead to more jobs through better mobile broadband. However, the empirical link demonstrating that broadband increases employment—rather than simply being correlated with higher employment—has not been rigorously established, as Georgetown Professor John Mayo and I demonstrate in a paper published earlier this year.

As a result, even if DOJ were willing to consider effects external to the firms, industry, and direct consumers, the speculative nature of the claims would probably cause the DOJ to disregard them. As the Merger Guidelines note,

Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means. Projections of efficiencies may be viewed with skepticism, particularly when generated outside of the usual business planning process. (p.30)

The FCC is more sympathetic to the effect on jobs than DOJ, but the staff report made it clear that it expected the merger to result in a net loss of direct employment and was highly skeptical of the claims regarding the indirect effects on employment (see Section V(G), beginning at paragraph 259 for the jobs discussion).

In short, even setting aside the substantive questions of the net effects on competition, consumers, and broadband availability, the merger was always going to be an especially tough sell in the current economic and political climate.

To win the day, AT&T had to convince antitrust authorities that improved efficiencies by the merged firm would outweigh any resulting reduction in competition while simultaneously convincing politicians that the merger was good for jobs. But convincing DOJ that the company would increase employment risked signaling to DOJ that the merger was not about efficiency, and convincing the FCC that the merger was good for efficiency risked signaling to the FCC that the merger would not produce jobs.

Unable to thread that needle, AT&T’s strategy collapsed. Whether it will succeed with a new strategy remains to be seen.

Spectrum Allocation in Japan

Tuesday, July 5th, 2011

I’m working on a case study of broadband in Japan. In the process I’ve translated the spectrum map for 335MHz-2.2GHz into English. Because I have not seen this in English I’m posting it here for anyone who might be interested. The translations are based on Google Translate — free to send me any corrections.

Where Does the Cable Industry think It’s Going? Empirical Observations from the 2010 and 2011 Cable Shows: More Programming and Consumer Interface Applications

Monday, June 20th, 2011

Many aspects of the 2011 Cable Show were the same as the previous year. Like last year, the show featured:

  • Lots of swag,
  • My inability to understand why some people wait in lines of 30 minutes or more to get a free backpack (do they really value their time that little?),
  • The need to stay far away from the booth with the purple dinosaur crooning about how he loves you and you love him except that clearly nobody loves him, probably because of his pathetic cries for attention,
  • Company slogans that make you hope they put more thought into their products, like Huawei’s “Innovation Through Technology” (which is kind of like “construction through equipment”),innovation through technology
  • Lots of white, grey, and black boxes packed with all kinds of cool stuff, but still just look like white, grey, and black boxes, and
  • Painful feet at the end of the day from too much walking and not enough sitting.

Despite those consistencies, some things were conspicuously (almost) absent this year. Most notably, the 2010 show floor was full of 3D television exhibits. This year a few booths had a 3D TV, but it was typically shoved into a corner, and nobody ever seemed to be watching it. Whether this means that companies that sell to cable have decided consumer demand for 3DTV is less than expected or simply decided nobody wanted to see that display again is hard to know.

Aside from the (thankfully, in my opinion) missing 3D experience, the plethora of inscrutable metal boxes makes it almost impossible to determine just from browsing the show floor what is new this year even if I were able to remember last year’s boxes.

Fortunately, the Cable Show categorizes exhibitors by what they do. These data make it possible to take an empirical look at where current industry participants think the cable industry is headed compared to what they thought last year.

The 2011 show featured 271 exhibitors, compared to 345 in 2010. On average, however, each exhibitor claimed to be promoting products in 4.0 product categories in 2011 compared to 2.7 product categories per exhibitor in 2010.  Because exhibitors chose more categories and the number of categories remained roughly constant, the average share of firms in each category increased by almost one percentage point. Even recognizing that general increase, certain product categories showed large increases. The share of firms offering programming increased by 21 percentage points, consumer interface technologies (e.g., set-top boxes, program guides) increased by 8.4 percentage points, and wireless technologies increased by 8 percentage points. The biggest decrease was among exhibitors offering system management, by about two percentage points.

Data

Presumably to make it easier for attendees to find the products that interest them, the Cable Show website groups exhibitors into business categories: 130 categories in 2010 and 128 in 2011. Most categories appear in both years, but 2010 had 11 categories not represented in 2011, while 2011 had 9 categories not represented in 2010. Table 1 lists the categories in alphabetical order and the number of firms in each.

It is not possible to compare the numbers directly, however, due to changes in the number of exhibitors. As Table 1 shows, the number of exhibitors fell from 2010 to 2011 while each exhibitor identified itself, on average, as offering products in more categories.

Table 1: Cable Show Number of Exhibitors and Categories

Number exhibitors Average categories per exhibitor
2010 345 2.7
2011 271 4.0

Who’s at the show and how did that change from 2010 to 2011?

Figure 1 shows how well represented each category is at the show. In particular, it shows the share of exhibitors in each category, ordered from least to most in 2010. This approach only partially normalizes the data—it controls for the smaller show size but does not control for possible reasons why firms chose to include themselves in so many more categories in 2011 than they did in 2010. Nevertheless, the figure provides a good view of which categories are the most popular.

Figure 1

Share of exhibitors in each category

Figure 2 shows the percentage point change in the share of firms in each category. Because firms chose so many more categories in 2011, the average change is about 0.9 percentage points. Thus, we can assume that any change bigger than 0.9 means that the category is better represented while any change less than 0.9 means the category is less prevalent at the 2011 show.

The Figure shows that the share of exhibitors categorizing themselves as “programming” increased substantially, as did exhibitors focusing on end-user interfaces including set-top boxes, personal video recording, and interactive services. Mobile also increased from 2010. Systems management appeared to have the biggest decrease from the previous year.

Figure 2

Conclusions

The 2011 show had about 20 percent fewer exhibitors than did the 2010 show. Those exhibitors placed themselves into far more categories, on average, than they did the previous year.

Controlling for the smaller show size, programming was substantially better represented in 2011 than in 2010, as were all manner of devices and software targeted at end-user interfaces, and wireless. Systems management showed the biggest decrease.

These changes are broadly consistent with what we observe in the broader communications landscape: the power of content companies relative to distributors and the growing importance of wireless. Firms that sell to cable apparently see growing expected profits in those areas, as well. Whether they turn out to be correct remains to be seen.

Table 2: Total Number Exhibitors in Each Category

Category 2010 2011
Accounting 3 5
Advertising 20 23
Amplifiers 3 6
Antennas 1 2
Architectural/Drafting 1 0
Billing Systems 14 14
Broadband Service Provider 5 4
Brokerage 0 1
Business Services 13 11
Cable Drop Installation 5 1
Cable Information 3 1
Cable Modem Manufacturer 0 3
Cable Modem Reseller 0 1
Cable Modems 3 4
Cable Programming 57 77
Cable Residential Gateways 7 14
Cable Supplies 1 0
Cablecasting Equipment 1 2
Calibrators 1 0
Children’s Programming 6 4
CMTS 4 6
Coaxial Cable Connectors 4 1
Coaxial Drop Cable 4 2
Commercial Insertion Equipment 2 2
Competitive Intelligence 2 4
Computer Aided Dispatch 1 1
Computer Services 3 5
Computer Software 22 24
Conditional Access 3 12
Construction Materials & Equipment 1 1
Consultants 10 6
Customer Retention 4 10
Datacommunications Equipment 2 8
Datacommunications Services 1 5
Digital Cable Receiver 4 4
Digital Compression 4 2
Digital Headend Equipment 14 18
Digital Video 14 23
Distribution Equipment 8 4
DVB Product 2 7
EAS Systems 1 0
Educational Programming 7 19
Electronic Entertainment 3 3
Electronic Recycling 1 1
Emergency Warning Systems 1 1
Engineering & Construction Services 0 1
Enhanced Systems 2 2
Equipment Recovery 2 0
Equipment Repair 3 1
Fiber Optic Cable 6 4
Fiber Optic Distribution Systems 5 6
Fiber Optic Equipment 6 7
Field Services 4 5
Filters 2 0
Financial Services 0 2
Fleet Management Services 3 4
Games 6 3
HDTV 36 36
Headend Equipment 17 14
HFC Cable Demodulators 3 1
HFC Cable Modulators 3 1
High-Speed Internet Access 4 3
Home Information Services 0 2
Home Shopping Program/Services 3 4
Installation Services 4 1
Intelligent Networking 6 5
Interactive Databases 4 4
Interactive Programming 14 21
Interactive Services 24 34
International Supplier 3 4
Internet Service Provider 4 6
Internet TV Provider 7 14
IPTV 42 46
Market Research 1 2
Marketing 7 7
Microwave Equipment 3 3
MMDS Equipment 1 0
Mobile 17 26
Multi-Media Systems 5 7
Music Library 1 0
Music Programming/Services 5 3
Network Management Systems 16 20
New Networks 3 6
News Services 3 6
Non-Profit Organization 6 2
Operational Support Systems Solutions 10 13
Optical Networking 8 6
Outside Plant, Fiber & Cable Enclosures 1 1
Pay Cable Programming 8 27
Pay-Per-View Equipment 1 1
Pay-Per-View Service 2 9
Personal Video Recording (PVR) 6 17
Primary Interactive Programming 0 2
Program Guides 7 10
Program Navigation Systems 1 4
Program Networks 29 19
Promotional Programs 3 0
Publications 3 2
Religious Programming 5 3
Remote Controls 5 6
Research & Development 5 2
Return Path Products 4 3
Routing Systems 1 3
Satellite 10 11
Security Dealer Programs 0 1
Security Systems 3 4
Set Top Boxes 18 25
Signal Security 2 1
Sound Services/Audio Equipment 2 0
Splitters 4 2
Sports Programming 9 7
Status Monitoring 6 3
Studios 0 6
Subscriber Authorization Systems 7 8
Subscriber Collection Services 2 5
Subscriber Pre-Screening 1 1
Subscriber Promotion 3 5
System Auditing 1 1
System Management 16 7
Systems Integrator 11 12
Telecommunications Equipment 20 14
Telecommunications Services 24 23
Telemarketing Services 1 0
Telephony Services 4 5
Test Equipment 6 6
Tools 2 2
Training Services 1 2
tru2way 19 20
Trunk & Distribution Cable 3 2
Video on Demand 52 52
VOIP 17 16
Voting/Polling 4 4
Weather Forecast Services 2 3
Weather Programming 2 3
WiFi Products/Services 6 9
Wire and Cable 3 1
Wireless Networking 9 9
Wireless Telephony Systems 1 4
Workforce Management System 7 14

[1] For an overview of the focus of the 2010 show, see http://www.cablefax.com/cfp/just_in/Cable-Show-Takeaways_41407.html

Net Neutrality Regulation’s First Target: Small Wireless Competitors?

Friday, January 14th, 2011

Telecommunications regulations have a long history of protecting incumbents, often because incumbents are able to use the regulatory process to insulate themselves from competition.  Unfortunately, we already see the seeds of that outcome in the response to a restrictive data plan offered by MetroPCS, but in this case due not to the actions of incumbents, but rather to the actions of some public interest groups.

MetroPCS, a regional mobile provider, offers a number of service plans with different voice and data combinations.  Its cheapest plan is $40 per month and offers unlimited voice, messaging, and web access.  The unlimited web access, however, does not allow access to certain sites like Netflix and Skype, but does allow access to YouTube.  Access to the full Internet requires a more expensive plan.

Net neutrality advocates argue that the restricted plans violate at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the new regulations.  The advocates may very well be correct, and that’s the problem.

MetroPCS is a small player in the mobile market, as the table from the FCC below demonstrates. It has no market power. Subscribers are not “locked in” when they sign up because they don’t have to sign contracts.

Wireless Subs Year-End 2009

Source: FCC 14th Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services. 2010. P.9. Note that these are voice subscribers.

MetroPCS must believe that this combination of unlimited voice and unlimited use of a restricted set of web services will appeal to some people, and that walling off certain parts of the Internet will reduce its costs.

As an entrant in a high fixed-cost market, MetroPCS must find ways to differentiate itself from the larger carriers and reduce costs if it is to succeed. While it sounds appealing on its face to make the entire web accessible to MetroPCS subscribers, requiring MetroPCS to offer precisely the same services as larger carriers could leave it with no sustainable business model.

Allowing MetroPCS to experiment with business plans does not, however, mean that it should mislead consumers.  Our perusal of its website and calls to customer service left us confused about which services, exactly, it excludes from the plan.  Presumably MetroPCS uses a well-defined algorithm for deciding which sites it excludes. It should be able to explain that algorithm to potential subscribers, though any harm is limited due to the absence of contracts, meaning that consumers can switch plans or cancel if they find the restrictions too onerous.

Despite this (hopefully soon-to-be-rectified) transparency issue, this plan is a business model that one of the smallest players in the mobile industry hopes will help it to compete successfully against its much bigger rivals.

Prohibiting MetroPCS from offering its new plan would benefit the large, incumbent carriers, not consumers. Let MetroPCS experiment.  It would be a shame if the Commission’s first enforcement action under the new regulation reduces wireless competition.

The FCC Tries to Find Its Way

Monday, June 21st, 2010

Three months after the Comcast decision the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) asking, basically, “what should we do now?”  Not being a lawyer, I have a difficult time understanding, let alone caring, whether the FCC’s regulatory authority derives from Title I or Title II.  As an economist, however, I do care about the content of proposed regulations.

So what problem does this NOI seek to solve?  It does not propose directly any new rules industry must follow.  Instead, it seeks a framework in which the FCC can regulate broadband in the future.

In other words, this NOI does not address how industry should behave, but rather how the FCC itself should behave.  Somewhat ironically, therefore, this NOI asks how to regulate the FCC, and reveals an existential problem for the Commission: what is it supposed to do, and does it have the authority to do it?

The Commission is to be commended for laying out the legal issues, but the road forward it proposes is inherently flawed.  Consider that scholars of new institutional economics generally agree that in order to be effective, regulatory institutions must meet several criteria: they must be independent from short-term political influence, transparent, accountable, and have clear limits on the extent of their jurisdiction.[1]

The NOI highlights the problem the FCC now faces as an institution—it does not know the extent or limits of its jurisdiction.  Ultimately, the FCC cannot set those boundaries itself.  Instead, it is up to Congress to define the FCC’s mission and the Courts to define the extent of its authority within its legislative mandate.

The current confusion is not the FCC’s fault.  Our telecommunications laws are antiquated and no longer appropriate for the fast-changing world of broadband and information technologies.  No amount of reclassification, forbearance, or other fancy footwork can change that basic fact.

It is time for Congress to rewrite our telecommunications laws in ways that do not rely on arbitrary definitions of services, and instead create an analytical framework flexible enough to accommodate these rapidly changing industries.  A new telecommunications law could recognize, for example, the inherent antitrust issues in many current debates, such as the question of vertical relationships underlying net neutrality.

Such a rewrite involves risks, to be sure.  Every interest group will fight to influence the process for good and ill, nobody will end up entirely happy, and we could end up with laws worse than those we have today.  Regardless, we could at least rest assured that a new law would better reflect the will of the people, as expressed through their elected representatives, than would the FCC’s current attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole.

Congress already appears to be taking the beginning steps in rewriting the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  It should view the NOI as a cry for help and further evidence that it should take action.  A regulatory agency simply cannot function properly when it has to ask in a public notice what it is allowed to do and how.  The courts have attempted to define boundaries in recent decisions, but the Commission believes it must act to meet Congress’s objectives.  But only Congress can define its objectives, and the time has arrived for it to do so.


[1] See Noll (2000) or Wallsten, et al (2004) for discussions (Noll, Roger. 2000. Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries. SIEPR Policy Paper. Wallsten, Scott, George Clarke, Luke Haggarty, Rosario Kaneshiro, Roger G. Noll, Mary Shirley, and Lixin Colin Xu. 2004. New Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications and Electricity Regulation Database. Review of Network Economics 3, no. 3: 248-282.)  See also Weiser (2009) for a discussion of institutional features of Internet regulation (Weiser, Philip J. 2009. The Future of Internet Regulation. Legal Studies Research Paper Series 09, no. 02).

The FCC’s New Wireless Competition Report: The Right Way to Look at the Industry

Saturday, May 22nd, 2010

“If we had any more innovation [in wireless] I think our heads would explode.”
– Professor Gerald Faulhaber, comment at wireless conference in Berkeley, April 2010.

Hats off to the FCC for its new approach to evaluating wireless competition.  Its latest report on wireless competition explicitly recognizes that wireless services now include such a broad range of industries, activities, and linkages to other sectors that it no longer makes sense to think of wireless as a single, overarching “industry.”  Many observers believe—happily or indignantly, depending on who they are—that by failing to apply the phrase “effective competition” to everything wireless the FCC is sending a signal that it sees reasons to be concerned.

Perhaps that is the Commission’s intent.  Perhaps not.  I’ll leave divining its intentions to the Kremlinologists.  Instead, let’s step back and take a look at some of the economics underlying the analysis and the report’s central conclusions.

Until the 1980s economic analysis relied on the so-called “structure-conduct-performance paradigm” (SCPP) in which market structure was taken as given and a concentrated market was assumed to allow firms to behave as monopolists and therefore raise prices and reduce output.  Therefore, a small number of firms was, by itself, cause for concern.  It sounds reasonable, and policymakers still seem implicitly to embrace the SCPP.  But a funny thing happened along the way to testing this seemingly obvious theory.  The empirical relationship between market structure and firm performance turned out to be weak.

It remains true that it is easier for a smaller number of firms to collude to raise prices and lower output than it is for a larger number of firms, so estimating market concentration can be a useful starting point for analysis.  However, economists realized in the 1980s that analyses of competition had to recognize that there is no straight line between market structure and performance, other factors are involved, and, indeed, firm performance itself plays an important role in determining market structure.  That means analyses of competition must focus on firm behavior and actual market outcomes to determine whether an industry is competitive.

Which brings us back to the FCC’s latest wireless competition report.

The report compiles lots of data on both market structure and the various aspects of behavior and performance of firms related to wireless.

Any concerns about the industry must come from certain features of market structure.  In particular, the report notes that the weighted average national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index increased to 2848, which indicates a concentrated industry, though the indicator varies widely across geographic areas.

Key indicators of behavior and performance in the industry—and therefore the most relevant features to evaluating its competitiveness—are eye-opening.

  • Churn (a measure of how many people switch providers and therefore an indicator of switching costs): increased slightly from 1.9% to 2.1% per month.  A recent study suggests that this rate of churn is higher than the average across industries.
  • Prices: The annual cellular consumer price index (CPI) decreased by 0.2% from 2007-2008, while the overall CPI increased by 3.8% during the same time period.
  • Pricing plans: New pricing plans emerged, based on prepaid and unlimited models, in addition to the more standard post-paid “bucket” of minutes.
  • Average Revenue per User (ARPU): ARPU has been flat, in nominal dollars, for years at about $47.
  • Profit margins: The report notes, “While the seven largest mobile wireless service providers all had EBITDA margins over 20 percent during the second quarter of 2009, only four – AT&T, MetroPCS, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless – had EBITDA margins greater than 30 percent, and the two largest providers had the highest EBITDA margins.”  The weighted average EBITDA for 2008 Q4 (the latest data the report provides that allow us to create the weights) is about 35 percent, down slightly from about 36 percent three years earlier.
  • Investment inputs: Wireless providers invested somewhere between $20-$25 billion in their networks in 2008 (the report notes that different sources had different estimates), which represents either a small decrease or increase from the previous year and a decrease in terms of investment as a share of revenue.
  • Investment outputs: The number of cell sites increased from about 18,000 in 2007 to almost 29,000 in 2008.
  • Advertising: In 2008 the wireless industry was the sixth-highest spender on advertising among product categories.  It was the second-highest spender of advertising on Spanish-language television.
  • Handsets: Between 2006 and 2009 the number of manufacturers selling mobile handsets in the U.S. increased from 8 to 16, and the number of available handset models increased from 124 to 260.
  • Device innovation: In addition to the rise of smartphones, the report notes that entirely new wireless devices, like mifi cards that receive a cellular wireless signal and transmit a wifi signal, and machine-to-machine hardware are emerging.
  • Entry and exit: We see lots of both, with entry by providers like Leap, Metro PCS, and Clearwire, and exit through mergers.
  • Call quality: Problems per hundred calls decreased to its lowest level ever in 2008 and remained there in 2009.  Moreover, the gap in quality across providers decreased.

Other data are more ambiguous.  The report notes, for example, that some providers have increased early termination fees, but that those increases seem to be associated with higher handset subsidies.  The report further notes that the same handsets are available without early termination fees at much higher prices.

In short, we see in wireless an excellent example of why economists have largely abandoned the SCPP approach to evaluating competition in favor of looking at actual outcomes.  Thus, even if we accept the premise that the market for wireless providers has become more concentrated, we nevertheless see an incredibly dynamic market that is yielding new devices, new services, and lower prices.  Professor Gerry Faulhaber remarked at a conference on wireless in Berkeley last month, “if we had any more innovation I think our heads would explode” (see video at 9:35).

The FCC made a smart decision to gather lots of data about the myriad components of wireless and to focus most of its efforts on examining outcomes.  This approach will allow the Commission to make changes to its reports almost in real-time—a necessity given the rate of change in the industry itself.