Author Archive

Antitrust and High-Tech: The Do-Not-Cold-Call List

Friday, September 24th, 2010

It has been the practice of some prominent Silicon Valley companies (and perhaps other companies as well) to refrain from “cold calling” employees of companies with whom they collaborate.  This seems like it could be a reasonable practice since companies may be less willing to enter into beneficial collaborations if they think their best employees can easily be stolen away.  In any event, the companies never agreed to refrain from talking to employees who expressed some interest in changing jobs (that would not be a cold call) or to refrain from hiring any of their collaborators’ employees, so the effect of these cold-call agreements was likely small.

Nevertheless, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice opened an investigation because it was concerned that the do-not-cold-call agreements were anticompetitive and had the effect of depressing wages.  That investigation is now complete and six major companies—Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar—have settled with the DOJ and essentially agreed not to  enter into do-not-cold-call agreements for a period of five years.

We don’t know whether this is a good or bad settlement, but neither does the Division, because it didn’t look at the economic consequences of the do-not-cold-call agreements or of the settlement on wages or on competition.  Instead of looking at the evidence, which the Division would have done had it evaluated the case under a “rule of reason,” the Division viewed these agreements are per se violations of the antitrust laws.

These agreements could be anti-competitive, but they may also could be pro-competitive, for at least two reasons:  They remove a potential impediment to pro-competitive collaborations between companies.  They may also serve as some balance to California’s weak do-not-compete legal regime.  (Strong do-not-compete employment provisions are not enforceable in California).

The Division should have viewed this as a “rule of reason” case and evaluated both the potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of do-not-cold-call agreements.  Expanding the scope of per se antitrust violations in the absence of analysis can interfere with productive collaboration, efficient employment practices, and, ultimately, innovation in these critically important high-tech industries.

If you like the Do Not Call List, should you want a Do Not Track List?

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

At a Senate Commerce Committee hearing last week, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Liebowitz indicated that the agency is exploring the idea of a Do Not Track List that would allow consumers to block servers from tracking their online activities.  A Do Not Track List sounds like a good idea, because the Do Not Call List for telemarketing calls is popular.  Before moving forward with a Do Not Track List, however, the FTC should thoroughly analyze its benefits and costs and determine whether there are more cost-effective ways of achieving the same objective.  Here is my back-of- the-envelope assessment.

Benefits:

People who sign up for a Do Not Track List will do so because they derive some utility simply from knowing they are not being tracked.  This value is not easily quantifiable, but some people will surely be better off.

However, the more tangible benefits of the Do Not Call List – reducing unwanted marketing solicitations – are not there with a Do Not Track List.  Consumers would not necessarily receive fewer ads.  (Indeed, it would be difficult for them to know if the list were actually working)  They would just receive ads that are less-well-targeted to their interests.  There are ways that consumers can block ads on the Internet, but a Do Not Track List is not one of them.

Costs:

First, there are direct costs of implementation.  This would be a fairly major undertaking for the FTC, so these costs are probably not trivial.

Second, there are indirect costs in terms of the quantity and quality of services and content on the Internet.  These costs would be borne not only by Do Not Track List participants but by other Internet users as well.  A Do Not Track List (depending on how many people signed up) would reduce the value of the Internet as an advertising medium, and therefore would reduce the revenues available to support Internet content.  A Do Not Track List would also affect the quality of major Internet services, such as search engines, which use data on search histories to update and improve their algorithms, and to protect against threats such as search spam, click-fraud, malware and phishing.  If search engines have less data, they can’t do this as well.  In sum, there are positive externalities to the information generated by online tracking that support the services that everyone uses.  Consumers who signed up for a Do Not Track List would be free-riding off those consumers who allowed their data to be used.

Finally, consumers who signed up for a Do Not Track List would receive ads that were less-well-targeted and therefore less useful.  The cost of this would depend on the value these consumers place on advertising.

Cost-Effectiveness:

Even if one were to conclude that the benefits of a Do Not Track List were greater than the costs, there is still a cost-effectiveness question:  is this the least costly way for consumers to avoid being tracked?  The answer is probably not, because users can already adjust their browser settings to avoid being tracked.  Many (perhaps most) users don’t know how to do this, but it’s easy to learn if you want to.  It only takes a few clicks.  In fact, it would likely be just as easy to learn how to adjust your browser to avoid being tracked as to sign up for a Do Not Track List and it would be totally under the user’s control.  Why should the FTC set up a whole new program to do something that consumers can fairly easily do for themselves?  A better, more cost-effective alternative would be for the FTC to post an online tutorial showing consumers how to do it.

Of course, the fact that most consumers probably haven’t taken the trouble to learn how to adjust their browser settings may mean that they don’t place a very high value on not being tracked.  That suggests the benefits of a Do Not Track list would be small, likely far smaller than the costs.

President Obama’s Spectrum Announcement

Tuesday, July 6th, 2010

The Obama Administration announced last week that it is adopting as Administration policy the spectrum portion of the FCC’s broadband plan.  This announcement is important because it will take a concerted effort on the part of the Administration to achieve the goals of the plan – i.e., to free up 500 MHz of spectrum for wireless broadband, primarily from reluctant federal agencies and broadcasters.  The spectrum initiative is arguably the most important part of the broadband plan.  (For another discussion of some of the options for increasing spectrum for broadband, see the TPI paper by Larry White, James Riso, and me.)

President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies, outlining how the Administration intends to achieve this goal.  The memorandum is a good start, but it will take more than that for this effort to be successful.

The memorandum states that the Secretary of Commerce must submit progress reports twice a year to the National Economic Council (NEC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).  Making those reports public would be a useful next step since that could create more pressure for agencies to show results.

NEC Director Lawrence Summers expanded on the President’s memorandum in a speech at the New America Foundation.  His speech may mark an important turning point in spectrum policy if it truly helps free up 500 MHz of spectrum.  Two other aspects of his speech, however, raise some questions.

Summers explained that the Administration proposes to use the auction proceeds first, for a public safety network, second, for job-creating infrastructure investment, and, a distant third, for deficit reduction.  The implication is that any new government revenue must be spent.  While many worthwhile projects certainly exist, hopefully new spending ideas will be subject to careful benefit-cost analyses.

Summers also placed the spectrum initiative in a broader economic context, and in the process seemed to imply that public action is generally a prerequisite for private sector investment and innovation.  That’s clearly the case with spectrum, but spectrum is a special case because the government controls it.  So, obviously, the government needs to act to free up spectrum for private sector activities.  In other cases, Summers’ proposition is debatable.

Social Networking Privacy Practices – Giving Behavioral Advertising a Good Name

Monday, May 24th, 2010

Ever since Facebook introduced its new personalization programs, users, privacy groups, and lawmakers have complained that Facebook’s privacy controls are overly complex and change too frequently.  Thus, users who are not sufficiently alert may unintentionally release personal information to people who shouldn’t have that information.  A lot of people are rapidly becoming more alert.

In response to the flurry of criticism and, perhaps, to forestall government action, Facebook just announced that it will introduce new privacy controls that it hopes will be more transparent and easier to navigate. Google, faced with a similar problem a few months ago with its new feature, Buzz, also changed its privacy controls in response to vocal criticism.

So we see companies and users struggling to find where social networking ends and privacy intrusions begin.  The question for those of us concerned with public policy is whether the government can be helpful in this type of situation – for example, by providing guidelines as suggested by Senator Schumer.

Whatever one thinks of Facebook’s actions, it’s hard to envision how the FTC or any government agency could do anything that wouldn’t seriously interfere with the ability of businesses in young and fast-changing industries like social networking to introduce new services and try new business models.  The exception would be if Facebook misrepresents to its users what it is doing.  In that case, the FTC might have reason to bring an enforcement action under the current law.

So, despite the missteps, Facebook’s privacy practices are best left to be worked out between the site and its users.  Notwithstanding its rapid growth, the company ultimately will not succeed if it isn’t responsive to its users’ privacy concerns.

What is interesting about the recent Facebook and Google Buzz privacy episodes is that the discussions have mostly not been about the use of information for targeted advertising.  This strikes me as a positive development in that perhaps it will make people more aware of the real differences between information on social networking sites and the use of information for targeted advertising.  People are understandably concerned about the unintentional dissemination of personal information about themselves, including potentially to people they know, and they therefore need to pay close attention to the privacy controls.  That particular concern is not present with targeted advertising, because advertisers use information anonymously (see article by Paul Rubin and myself).  Indeed, even the latest news about Facebook and other social networking sites sending information to advertisers about the last webpage a user visited before clicking on an ad, which could be the user’s profile page, is not particularly a cause for concern.  (In any event, the sites have addressed the problem).  The process of targeting advertising based on users’ interests does not involve human beings looking at any individual’s data.  It is entirely automated.

I am not suggesting that targeted advertising has no connection to the new features being introduced by Facebook, Google and others for whom advertising is the major, often the sole, revenue source.  These companies are trying to increase the number of eyeballs, the amount of time the eyeballs spend on their sites, and the quality of information available in order to better target advertising and thus increase revenues.  Presumably, however, the information people make available is valuable for targeted advertising only when it is used anonymously.

FTC Clears Google-AdMob Deal

Friday, May 21st, 2010

The FTC today cleared Google’s acquisition of AdMob – a good decision – stating that “the Commission voted unanimously to close its investigation of Google’s acquisition of AdMob because it lacked reason to believe that the transaction would likely result in a substantial lessening of competition, especially in light of marketplace developments that occurred during the course of its investigation….In any nascent market there will be uncertainty about the path of competition and the durability of early leads in market share.”  This is the difficulty of applying the merger guidelines in such markets.  It’s good that the Commission came to this decision and did so unanimously.  To the extent that this sends a signal to other start-ups in similar situations, it is a pro-innovation signal, as I discussed in an earlier piece.

Regulating the Internet

Thursday, May 6th, 2010

So much for data-driven policy:

The Third Way

Google’s Acquisition of AdMob

Wednesday, May 5th, 2010

A decision by the FTC on whether to allow Google’s acquisition of AdMob to go forward is imminent and Tech Daily Dose today referenced a blog post by mobile app developer Wertago about its experience with the FTC staff investigating the deal.  Its a very interesting little essay and I recommend it to anyone interested in how the antitrust agencies review mergers in the technology sectors.   Wertago is a customer in this market, so they would be expected to be concerned if the proposed acquisition was anticompetitive.

One of the things the essay emphasizes is the importance of maintaining vigorous competition in the market to acquire innovative new start-ups:

Just imagine, as a thought experiment, what would happen if Google explicitly stated that it would buy up every start-up ad network that reached some minimum level of ad revenue. The FTC might think that’s presumptively anti-competitive, but we’re not sure that’s necessarily correct. The incentive might spur more entrants into the ad network business, just as the ADC prize money incentivized us to create the great nightlife app that is Wertago. As we pointed out to the FTC staff members we spoke to, many ad networks likely start out tacitly HOPING to one day be bought out by Google, just as app developers tacitly hope to be bought out by this or that category-dominant player. Blocking the AdMob deal could actually remove one (very lucrative) exit possibility and thereby effectively reduce the returns on the risky enterprise of starting a business. As a result, blocking the deal could actually REDUCE incentives to compete in the ad network space.

This is an extremely important consideration that I also emphasized in a recent Forbes.com oped.  A policy that takes the biggest, most successful companies out of the acquisition market is not good for innovation.   It’s not clear how, or even whether, the antitrust agencies incorporate this type of consideration into their analysis, but they need to.